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This paper introduces series of house and land prices for Australia’s major capital cities for 
the period 1880-1970 which, spliced to modern data, give series spanning 1880-2010. The 
broad trends in prices for houses, land and rents highlight no significant movement in real 
prices for the first seventy years followed by a persistent and significant trend rise in prices. 
Cycles in house prices and housing activity played a major part in each of the seven major 
economic cycles in this period, the first associated  with the 1880s boom/1890s depression 
and finishing with a major cycle which commenced in the mid-1990s. 
JEL Code: G12; N97; R21; R31; R38
Key words: Australia, house prices, land prices, gross dwelling rents, price and rent 
controls, housing cycles, economic cycles. 1
1 Introduction
Since the early 1970s house prices in Australia have risen on average by 3% per annum in 
real terms, with the latest cycle commencing in the 1990s generating rises of the order of 
6% per annum. But if we can look back further in history, which the price series from 1880 
presented in this paper
1
The long-run history of prices allows some observations on the various cycles in house 
prices. The most conspicuous spike in prices occurred after the lifting of War-time price 
controls introduced in 1943 which, because they prevailed during a period of significant 
inflation  from  1943-1949,  caused  real  prices  to  be  artificially  compressed.  These  price 
controls,  in  conjunction  with  ceilings  on  house  rents and  the  low  construction  activity 
during the war years, exacerbated a post-World War 2 (WW2) shortage of housing which 
accentuated the subsequent spike in prices.
allows, the housing story turns out to be less a one-way street and 
more complex. In the 70 odd year period from 1880 till the mid 1950s there was negligible 
change in prices for houses in real terms (Figures 1, 2) and periods when prices fell quite 
significantly. Then from the mid-1950s there was a change in direction with house prices 
commencing the upward trajectory observed from the 1970s. Interestingly, the broad trend 
for house prices in the Australian market does not appear unique. A similar pattern can be 
discerned from estimates for the US (Shiller 2005) although the magnitude of price rises 
post-1950 is less for the US. Over the longer time span from 1625 to the 1960s, Eichholtz
(1997) observed negligible trend growth in prices for Amsterdam, followed by an upward 
shift in prices after the 1960s.
That interesting episode apart, the two cycles which appear to stand out are the boom-bust 
cycle of the 1880s/90s, already widely written about by historians
2
Australia’s  other  and  only  post-WW2 banking  crisis  occurred  in  conjunction  with  the 
recession of the early 1990s. While this coincided with a housing cycle, this recession and 
banking crisis was more to do with excesses in the commercial side of the property market.
In this cycle, house prices declined just 8% from their 1989 peak. By contrast the excessive 
overbuilding in the office property market saw prices decline by about 40%.  
, and the most recent 
boom of 1990s/2000s. The 1890s has often been compared with the 1930s, both periods 
when the aggregate economy experienced a ‘great depression’. In terms of what declines in 
housing activity subtracted from overall economic activity, the two periods are comparable 
but in terms of prices, the rises in the 1920s were more subdued and subsequently the falls 
experienced in real and nominal terms in the 1930s were less extreme. The other related 
contrast  between  these two  depression  periods  is  that  Australia  experienced  a 
“financial/banking crisis” in the 1890s but, despite the difficulties presented by a ‘great 
depression’, avoided a repeat in the 1930s.
1 The house price series build on, and incorporate revisions to, series developed in Stapledon (2007).
2 See for example Noel Butlin (1964), Sinclair (1976) and more recently Simon (2003).2
While much has been written about the excesses of the 1880s boom, in terms of magnitude 
of cyclical upswings in house prices, the price rises of the 1880s pale next to those of the 
last cycle starting in the 1990s. This last cycle has seen house prices rise by 111% in real 
terms versus, by comparison, a modest 33% in the 1880s.  The Sydney market peaked in 
2004 but, with other capital city markets benefiting from the major resources boom which 
kicked off in the mid 2000s, the overall market peak was in 2008. This peak coincided with 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, a major feature of which was major price falls in 
housing markets across the US and Europe. However, house prices in Australia experienced 
very minor falls before heading higher again from mid 2009 – the overall market registered 
a rise of 15% by mid 2010. The full story is yet to be told but, as the 1880s boom also
illustrated, while the housing cycle is an influence on the economy, the factors driving the 
economy are a very powerful influence on the housing cycle.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following two sections outline the sources of the house 
price  series  and  compares them  with  earlier  historical  estimates.  The  broad  trends  are 
discussed in section 4. Then in the subsequent three sections, the major cycles in the pre-
WW2 period, the period of price controls and the post-WW2 cycles are discussed. There is 
a brief conclusion.
2 House Price Series 1880-1970
The annual house price series for Sydney and Melbourne for the period 1880-1970 are 
generated from two sources: actual sale prices for the period 1950-1970 and asking prices
for the period to 1950. The actual selling price series are sourced from weekly property 
market reports published in the main city daily newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald
and the Melbourne Age.
3 The Sydney reports are available in the years before 1950, albeit 
in lesser depth, while the Melbourne series starts in 1950. BIS-Schrapnel published house 
price series from these same sources for the period 1965-89 and the Real Estate Institute of 
Australia (REIA) used this source as the basis for house price series starting from 1979. 
These sale price series are imperfect but they provide a reasonable measure of house prices
where the focus is on broad trends and cycles as distinct from precise measurement of 
short-term changes in prices. The key issue for all these sale price series is whether the
samples of prices are reasonably representative of the prices of the population of houses. In 
later periods, where comparison can be made between raw series of sales published by the 
REIA and series stratified by the ABS from large samples of sales, the comparison does 
suggest the sale price series are reasonably close to the true price.
4
3 So far as the author can ascertain from perusing capital city newspapers, there are not similar reports for the 
other capital cities.
With a higher level of 
confidence  it  can  be  said  that  the  broad  trends  in  the  sale  price  series  are  a  good 
representation of movements in the market.
4 The sample sizes mostly range from 200-500 with a median sample of about 300. Much larger sample sizes 
would be needed to do more detailed stratification of the series and the cost would be very substantial. 3
Stepping backwards, in the period 1942-49 house prices in Australia were subject to price 
controls,  with  the  prices  fixed  at  their  levels  for  1942.  One  result  was  that  sales,  and 
certainly publicly recorded sales in Sydney, gradually dried up in this period. High inflation 
rates in this period implied significant declines in the real price of housing so that, apart 
from  deceased  estates,  there  were  few  willing  sellers.  There  was  a  black  market  for 
established houses in this period but not unexpectedly there are no records. However, the 
sales actually recorded for Sydney show prices at about 1942 levels consistent with the 
legal requirement for fixed prices in this period.  
For the years 1880-1943, the annual price series are based on asking prices from the sample 
of  houses  advertised  for  sale  by  private  treaty in  the  Sydney  Morning  Herald  and 
Melbourne Age  newspapers  respectively. There are  two precedents for  an  asking  price 
series. The first is an asking price series for Melbourne 1861-91 constructed by Noel Butlin 
(1962) and presented in terms of price per room. The second is an unpublished study by the 
US  National  Housing  Agency.
5 The  US study  collated  asking  prices  from  newspaper 
advertisements for 100 cities for the period 1940-47 and for Washington, DC for the period 
1918-47. The series for Washington does appear to provide a reasonable picture of trends in 
houses prices over the period 1918-47, showing a similar pattern to the Grebler, Blank and 
Winnick (1956) series  for  22  cities over  the  same  years 1918-34.  The  authors  of  the 
Washington series acknowledged the limitations of using asking prices, identifying three
sources of potential bias: period to period changes in the sample; houses with advertised 
prices may not represent the population of houses; and the relationship between asking and 
actual prices received can vary over the cycle with, for example, sellers accepting larger 
discounts to the asking price when the market is  weaker. The first two points are also 
common to sale price series.
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The Sydney and Melbourne house price series for the period 1880-1970 have been used as 
the base to construct a series for median house price series for all the capital cities for the 
period 1880-1970 which, spliced with existing series post-1970, gives a series for 1880-
2010. Similarly, a series for the mean market value of all private dwellings for Australia 
The third point is specific to an asking prices series. In terms 
of cycles, the Sydney-Melbourne series probably miss some of the short-term small shifts 
in prices and lacks precision on timing due to variation in the discount but, as with the 
Washington series, observation of the series indicates that it captures the major movements 
and cycles. This includes falls. There is a view that sellers are reluctant to drop their prices 
but that is not the experience with these price series in the period 1880-1943. 
5 Ad Analysis – a Technique to Study Prices of Single-Family, Other-than New Houses, cited in Fisher (1951) 
6 In recent times, with larger samples of house sales and information about the characteristics of houses sold, 
and the use of hedonic techniques, more precise measures of housing price movements have been developed 
(see Prasad and Richards, 2006; Hansen, 2006) which partially address the first two points. Nonetheless, the 
heterogeneity of houses means that some degree of imprecision is inherent. 4
has  been  constructed  which  when  spliced  with  estimates  from  the  Reserve  Bank  of 
Australia from 1988, gives estimates for the period 1880-2010.
The new series measure house prices for the sample of houses for each year. That is, when 
comparing years, the series do not measure pure price changes: the changes in price also 
reflect  improvements  in  the  average  quality  of  the  housing  stock  and  changes  in  the 
locational composition of the stock as the urban areas have expanded. In Stapledon (2007) 
the long-term impact of improvements, or capital spending, on the mean value (in constant 
prices) of the housing stock is estimated to have added an average of 0.95% per annum to 
the real value of housing in the period 1961-2005. This improvement reflects the growth in 
the average size and quality of new stock being added each year, and the alterations and 
additions to the existing stock. Estimates also indicated that the changing composition of 
the  stock  probably  subtracted  0.35%  per  annum  from  the  mean  price.  Changing 
composition refers to the fact that, as the boundaries of a city grow, the median house 
moves out – so for example the median house in the 1950 housing stock is in 2000 closer in 
and its land value is higher than the median house in the housing stock of 2000. The net 
effect of these quality and compositional effects is a net addition of 0.6% per annum which, 
subtracted from the price series estimates, gives a ‘constant quality’ index series for house 
prices. Applying this 0.6% adjustment factor to the whole period, the average rise in real 
terms over the period 1880-2010 of 1.6% becomes an estimate of 1% per annum in terms of 
pure price changes.
Data collected for  prices  of  residential  lots  of  land  for  sale  or  sold in  Sydney  and 
Melbourne provide an insight into the story of house prices. The land lots for sale in any 
period  will  include  land  from  all  segments  of  the  urban  area  but  will  tend  to  be 
predominantly new allotments for sale in the outer suburbs of a city. Hence, the price series 
will not provide a measure of the average value of land lots in the urban area but rather a
crude measure of the price of fringe land. The mean price will be affected by the sale of a 
portion of high priced blocks closer to the centre but the median price will be less affected 
and can be taken as a reasonable proxy for the level and trends in the price of lots at the 
urban fringe. The series are volatile and to ascertain broad trends, the estimates have been 
aggregated into period averages in Table 1. That Table also contains estimates of the ratio 
of  the  fringe  land  to  house  prices  for  those  periods  which  gives an  indication  of  the 
contribution of changes in fringe urban land prices in the Sydney and Melbourne markets to 
the changes in  houses prices in those markets.
3 Comparison with Earlier Historical Estimates
There are few historical estimates of house prices for Australia prior to the 1960s against 
which to benchmark the various new series. Daly (1982) has collated some estimates at five 
yearly estimates for Sydney within the period 1880-1940 and the levels of the estimates 5
appear to be similar for specific years.
7 Abelson (1985) has constructed annual estimates 
for Sydney, based on valuations of property, which covers the period 1925-70. While not 
matching the short-term movements, the broad direction and magnitude of the Abelson 
series in the period 1925-70 is consistent with that of the new price series. A series from 
Neutze (1972) spanning the period 1949-67 is also broadly consistent with the new series 
for that corresponding period. For Melbourne, there is even less historical data. A number 
of studies have been done of the boom-bust of the 1880s and 1890s in Melbourne. For the 
1880s, there is the Noel Butlin series for Melbourne of asking price per room 1861-91 
which  closely  matches  the  new  series and,  consistent  with  the  new  series, has  prices 
peaking in 1888.
8
In terms of national estimates of houses prices, the Australian Treasury and Reserve Bank 
of Australia (RBA) have constructed unpublished series starting from 1960 for internal use
in their modelling of the economy, using the various available series starting with BIS-
Schrapnel series for Sydney and Melbourne prices as their primary base for the 1960s and 
1970s.
Fisher and Kent (1999) and Simon (2003) have constructed series for 
Sydney and Melbourne for the 1880s and early 1890s which are based on valuations of 
rateable properties:  in both cases, the magnitude of the movements is comparable with the 
new house price series.
9 These series are very close to the overlapping Stapledon (2007) estimates for the 
1960s and to the series from 1970 spliced using various series prior to the ABS series 
starting in 1986. The Australian Treasury had used these to construct and publish June 
quarter estimates of aggregate market value, and implicitly mean values per dwelling, of 
private dwelling assets in Australia, this published series of estimates starting in June 1960. 
In a Treasury publication Goldbloom and Craston (2008) announced that the Treasury had
discontinued this series in 2007 in favour of the RBA series of the aggregate market value 
of private dwellings. What Goldbloom and Cranston failed to mention was that the RBA
and Treasury series had diverged in the 1990s and a review by the two institutions and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics of the two series had seen the Treasury concede and adopt 
the RBA  estimates.
10
7 The poor quality of the Figure (Daly, 1982: Figure 5.5, page 148) in which some of the price estimates are 
embedded, make exact comparison difficult. Daly did not publish his estimates in tabular form.
In the period 1960-88, the RBA  estimates are very  close to the 
estimates in Stapledon (2007).
8 Noel Butlin (1964), page 276, Table 62. Noel Butlin took the view that the increase in number of rooms per 
dwelling was a proxy measure for quality, but on pages 221-23 he discusses a whole range of factors which 
lifted the quality of housing apart from the increase in number of rooms. 
9 Unpublished  estimates  by  the  Australian  Treasury  of  mean  house  prices  supplied  to  the  Productivity 
Commission and presented in real terms in Figure 2.1, page 16 of the Productivity Commission Discussion 
Draft “First Home Ownership” December, 2003.
10 ABS (2005) discussion paper on the disparity between the two series in the period after 1995, while not 
directly criticising the Treasury series, came out in support of the Reserve Bank series. The ABS paper has 
the Treasury Series cited as a reference but the text pointedly makes no reference to it. However, the ABS 
paper was written after an ABS/Treasury/RBA tri-partite (internal) review and did specifically adopt the RBA 
measure of the market value of housing as its preferred measure. The Treasury then quietly discontinued their 6
4 Discussion of Broad Trends
The broad trends that can be observed are that the real median price for houses (Figures 1
and 2) rose only marginally in the 70 year period from 1880 to the mid 1950s.
11 And if the 
rental price of housing is observed over the same period, with allowance for the distorting 
impact of rent controls in the 1940s and 1950s, the measure of real gross rent per dwelling
(Figure 3) also shows relative stability in this period. From the mid 1950s, however, there 
is a clear shift in trajectory as the median house price grows significantly in terms of all 
measures and real rents also show a clear upward trend. Taking 1955 as the turning point
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Housing  represents  a depreciating  asset  sitting  on  a block  of  land.  If the  value of  that 
depreciating asset approximates to its replacement cost which in turn moves closely in line 
with general inflation, then house price movements are primarily a function of land.
,
over the 50 plus year period 1955-2009, the median house price for the All Capitals shows
a rise in real terms of 3.6 times or 2.5% per annum. Over this period Sydney prices rose 
about 2.7% per annum, while Melbourne prices have risen about 1.8% per annum. These 
broad trends in prices and rents and the shift in trajectory from the mid 1950s can also be 
observed in the price-to-income ratio (Figure 3) which shows no trend change then a clear 
upward trend in the second half of the 20
th century.
13 The 
price of land can be separated into the fringe price of urban land, for which some data is 
available, and the location premium attached to proximity to, for example, the CBD.
14
series in 2007 and adopted the Reserve Bank series for the period 1960-2007 (Goldbloom and Cranston 
2008).
If
Sydney and Melbourne fringe land prices are observed (Table 1), they are volatile and, 
while they are high in the 1880s, they appear to show no clear trend in real terms from the 
1890s to the mid-1950s. Then, in the period from the mid-1950s to the 1970s the price of 
fringe land in Sydney and Melbourne increased sharply in real terms and that, in turn,
appears to explain a significant portion of the rise in median house prices in this period. In 
the case of Sydney, whereas in the first half of the 1950s, the cost of fringe land represented 
about 10%  of  the  median  house  price,  it rose  thereafter  with  the  sharpest  movements 
occurring in the first half of the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, and by the latter 
period the cost of fringe land had risen nine fold and accounted for 60% of the median price 
of  a  house  in  Sydney (Table  1). The  rise  in  Sydney  fringe  land  prices  accounted  for
11 These rises refer to the series adjusted for quality changes.
12 In Stapledon (2007) page 84 Chow tests in Table 3.1 support 1955 as a suitable choice for a turning point.
13 Over the long term, inflation in housing construction costs has tended to run marginally higher than general 
inflation but not enough to change the general point that changes in land prices are the dominant influence on 
house price movements.
14 The location premium rises from zero at the fringe to a peak at the centre, the point at which transport costs 
are zero. The slope of the location premium is also referred to as the transport gradient. There are features 
other than transport costs which give locations a premium (e.g. proximity to ocean) but transport explains a 
significant portion.   7
effectively the whole of the rise in median house prices in the period to the mid-1970s. For 
Sydney, the rate of appreciation in the fringe land price decelerated after 1975 but from the 
high base established in the first half of the 1970s, prices nonetheless approximately trebled
in the period to the first half of the 2000s. In doing so, this rise in the price of fringe land 
accounted for about two thirds of the rise in median house prices in Sydney in this later 
period. That leaves an unexplained component to the rise in median house prices which 
points to a significant rise in the location premium.
The story for Melbourne is similar to Sydney but different at the margins in terms of timing
and magnitude. Fringe land prices were rising only steadily in the period to the mid-1970s 
and only then rose sharply. And over the period from the early 1950s-2000s, Melbourne 
fringe land prices have risen about half the rate of Sydney prices.
Australia’s  experience  with  housing  prices  appears  to  be  consistent  with  the pattern 
observed in the other countries for which series are available. Long-run series for the US 
(Shiller, 2005) and the Netherlands (Eichholtz 1997) also show little change in real house 
prices in the period 1880s-1950s, with prices then rising in the second half of the 20
th
century.  Eichholtz’s series is for an area of Amsterdam and spans the period from 1627-
1970 and then can be spliced with series for the Netherlands. For that three hundred odd 
year period his series seems to suggest that, cycles in prices aside, there was little change in 
house prices in real terms. If that were to be correct for all housing markets, it would make 
the period from the 1950s even more unique. The caution is that, with data available for just 
two other markets, the sample is too small to be entirely convincing. 
The  question  these  broad  trends  pose  is  how  do  we  explain  them?  In  this  paper,  the 
objective has been to outline the broad trends and not be diverted into what is a significant 
subject matter in its own right. The key point I would make is that it does not appear to be a
simple matter of the demand variables of population and income driving prices. Population 
growth has been slower in the post-WW2 years than was the case in the pre-WW2 years, 
even despite the disruption caused by WW1 and the two depressions. In the case of income,
if the ratio of nominal prices to nominal income is observed (Figure 3), it indicates a steady 
relationship between prices and income up to the mid-1950s and then a substantial change 
in that  relationship  with  prices  rising  well  ahead  of  income  thereafter.  One  possible 
explanation is that it involves the interaction of these key variables with supply variables. 
There  is  a  considerable  economic  literature  arguing  that  government  regulation and 
controls, which restrict the supply of land for urban use, are a major explanation of the
variation  in level  and  volatility of  prices  across segments  of  the  US  housing  markets 
(Malpezzi and Wachter 2005). In the context of explaining why prices in Australian cities 
are high relative to income, the Reserve Bank of Australia has pointed to supply factors 
being a major factor (Richards 2009). While the US studies have constructed comparative 
measures of the effect of regulation across markets at a point in time, the missing ingredient 
is the  difficult  task  of  constructing  quantitative  measures  of (the  effect  of) changes  in 
regulation  over time. In  the Australian  context,  for example,  we  can  point  to  the state 8
governments introducing legislation in the 1940s and 1950s which gave them powers for 
the orderly (meaning restricted) release of fringe land for housing.
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5 Pre-WW2 Cycles in Land and House Prices
In effect, the market 
for land was changed from relatively free to a fairly tightly controlled market. However, 
other factors could be at play. Transport is a major influence on land prices – access to the 
motor car was a factor tending to increase the supply (and reduce price) of land in the first 
half of the 20
th century but traffic congestion would have worked to lift prices in the later 
period. There is scope for further research in this area.
In the period 1880-1939, two cycles in housing prices stand out associated with the great 
depressions of the 1890s and 1930s but there was also a significant cycle in the 1910s cut 
short by WW1. The boom-bust cycle of the 1880s-90s was the biggest of the cycles. In the 
lead up to it, the period from 1850-90 was a period of very strong economic expansion for 
Australia – stimulated by the gold rushes of the 1850s and 1860s and rapid growth in the 
wool industry, the population expanded extremely rapidly (eight-fold from 400,000 to 3.2 
million) as substantial numbers of immigrants were drawn in by economic opportunities. 
More  specific to  the  1880s  and  relevant  to  housing, whereas  adult  population  growth 
averaged about 2.5% per annum in the 1860s and 1870s, it accelerated to close to 4% per 
annum in the 1880s (Figure 5), a factor here being  the baby boom generation from the 
1850s and 1860s moving into adulthood (Sinclair 1976, page 141). Sinclair also argues 
that, as the tail end of  the expansion, the 1880s was a period when increasingly more 
marginal investment opportunities were explored, encouraged by the high returns achieved 
in the earlier decades and accommodated by the capital inflows. The buoyancy of demand 
for most of the 1880s is reflected in the upward movement in house prices (Figures 1, 2) 
and rents (Figure 4) in the Sydney and Melbourne markets. Housing supply, measured by 
rate of growth in housing stock in Figure 5, responded to the higher prices and more or less
in line with the surge in population growth. However, supply was running ahead of demand 
growth  from  the  mid-1880s, and  as  the  supply-demand  balance  swung  more  towards 
surplus, the housing market started to falter and was vulnerable to any adverse demand 
shock. New housing supply peaked at its highest level in 1884 but there was a second peak 
in  1888,  from  which  supply  of  new  housing  dropped  20%  in  each  of  1889  and  1890, 
contributing to the first coincident decline in GDP in 1889.
16
15 In NSW Local Government (Town and Country) Amendment Act 1945 gave governments power to control 
all new development and land use. State Planning Authority (SPA) Act 1963 centralised this further giving 
powers to one authority for the orderly development and use of land in conjunction with the provision of 
public infrastructure. ‘Orderly’ was code for slow release of new land. In Victoria the Town and Country 
Planning (TCP) Act 1944 was more explicit in stating its objective was to address ‘the problem of extravagant 
and unrealistic sub-division of land on  the outskirts of built-up areas.’ With a lag, these and subsequent 
amendments gave government increasing control over the supply of land for new housing in Sydney and 
Melbourne. 
Signs of weakness were also
16 Based on the Noel Butlin (1962) estimates of GDP. Haig (2001) has GDP growth at sub-1% growth rates 
from 1889-91 but only negative in 1892.  9
evident in prices – Melbourne house prices peaked in 1889 and Silberberg (1975) has urban 
land prices peaking in 1888.
17
While the pre-conditions for a domestic recession were already there, the sharp turn in 
external factors from positive to negative accentuated the downturn with the combination of 
weaker demand and tighter credit conditions flowing through to sharp declines in asset 
prices and contributing to the most severe banking crisis experienced by Australia (Fisher 
and Kent 1999). For housing, this weakness fed into lower immigration and the next two 
decades saw population growth averaging under 2% per annum.  In terms of house rents, 
the weakness in demand translated into a very significant cyclical decline in rents (Figure 
4) against which, aside from the two war-time periods, there is no comparable experience. 
The cyclical downturn in rents associated with the 1930s depression is mild by comparison.
That is, in the housing story, there is evidence that boom 
had turned to bust before the Barings crisis of late 1890 was said to have triggered the 
collapse. The Barings crisis in London in late 1890 was linked to lending to Argentina 
which had, like Australia, experienced a major boom in property/construction in the second 
half  of  the  1880s  (Miles 2002). The  defaults  in  Argentina  cautioned  British  and  other 
investors to reappraise the optimistic scenarios underpinning their lending to all markets
and the subsequent withdrawal of capital was a factor in financial crises in a number of
countries including Britain itself, US and South Africa (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) and the 
global recession of the early 1890s.
Historians have Melbourne at the epicentre of the 1890s recession (Cannon 1972; Sinclair
1976). With the main gold discoveries in the Victorian hinterland, Melbourne had been the 
main beneficiary of the boom period and its population grew sixteen fold from 30,000 in 
1851 to 485,000 in 1890 (average 7.5% per annum), taking it comfortably past Sydney 
which over the same period grew seven fold (average 5% per annum) from 54,000 to about 
366,000. By  contrast in the 1880s, the growth  gap between the two had lessened with 
Melbourne’s population growth in the 1880s averaging 6% per annum, only slightly ahead 
of Sydney’s 5.5%. Then the first half of the 1890s saw Melbourne’s population contract by 
12% – it returned to positive growth in the second half but it was still lower in 1900 than it 
had been in 1890 and it had fallen behind Sydney which still managed to grow at about a 
2% per annum pace in the 1890s (Figure 6). In terms of house prices, Melbourne prices 
rose about 64% in real terms from 1880 to their peak in 1889, then fell by 51% to a trough 
in the mid 1890s.  To put that 1889 peak in perspective, prices in Melbourne did not revisit 
their 1889 levels until over sixty  years later in 1950 – in nominal terms they matched the 
1889 peak in 1918 but  that was due to general inflation associated with World War 1 and 
its aftermath. The duration of that weakness reflects the sheer volume of supply of new 
17 Silberberg (1975) has the rate of return over various time periods within the period 1880-92 positive till it 
turns negative in 1892 but the decline in the rate of return from its peak in 1888 is consistent with, or implies, 
a fall in prices from a peak in 1888.10
urban land lots developed in the 1880s boom which required or anticipated continued rapid 
growth of Melbourne, not the stand still that occurred.
18
The 1880s-90s price cycle in Sydney, in keeping with its less dramatic cycle in population 
growth, was less extreme than Melbourne’s experience but still stands out. Sydney median
prices rose a lesser 32% in the 1880s to a peak in 1892, that is, there was a lag of a few
years after Melbourne prices peaked and started their sharp decline. The subsequent fall 
was  about  36%  so  that,  while  the  boom  had  been  less  pronounced than  Melbourne’s 
experience, the immediate pain was still significant.  However, where the experience of the 
Sydney and Melbourne markets also differed was in the period between this cycle and the 
next big cycle of the early 1910s. Sydney experienced a cyclical recovery in the late 1890s 
which  in 1902 took prices  to  within  10%  of  their 1892  peak. By  contrast,  while  the 
Melbourne market also experienced a recovery from the extreme lows of the 1890s, the 
recovery was much more subdued and prices in 1902 were still about 35% below their 1889 
peak. 
The US and Europe recovered from global depression and experienced moderate expansion 
in  the  second  half  of  the  1890s.  This  external  recovery  contributed  to  the  Australian 
economy experiencing  a significant mining boom from the mid-1890s to early 1900s but 
this  was  focussed  in  WA,  Queensland  and  western  NSW  (Battellino  2010)  which  is 
reflected in strong population growth in the former two states – in part, drawing population 
from Victoria and Melbourne. Stagnant population in Melbourne reflected still stagnant 
economic conditions in that city which, in turn, made the process of clearing the excess 
supply of housing and land left over from the boom a drawn-out process. Conditions in 
other markets was more favourable as evidenced by the short-lived upswing in Sydney 
prices to 1902 coinciding with the peak in the mining boom, and the Perth and Brisbane 
markets would have been buoyant in this period. The next cycle came in the early 1910s 
and can be clearly seen in the spike in population growth which peaked in 1913 and in the 
rate of growth in the housing stock which peaked in 1914 (Figure 5). Prices in the Sydney 
market also picked up in this cycle but to levels still well below the peaks experienced in 
the  1880s  boom.  By  contrast,  while  Melbourne  also  experienced  a  cyclical  rise  in 
population growth (Figure 6), prices in the Melbourne market barely moved. The absence 
of a price response reflects the magnitude of the supply hangover from the 1880s boom –
surplus houses had been absorbed but surplus urban allotments were still it seems able to 
comfortably accommodate the lift in demand.
World  War  1  (WW1)  from  1914-18 impacted  on  both  the  demand  for  and  supply  of 
housing. On the demand side, it disrupted immigration flows so that population growth 
slowed sharply. The numbers of soldiers absent in the European war zone also had an 
impact on demand directly and indirectly, with it reported that there was significant sharing 
18 Silberberg (1975, page 209) quotes a number of local journals in 1888 reporting the strong evidence of a 
very large oversupply of allotments, one suggesting sufficient lots for a city of five times the then population. 11
of houses by absent soldiers’ families in this period.
19 Another factor was that, whereas in 
World War 2 the Federal Government introduced rent controls across the whole market, the 
Government  introduced  more  limited  controls  with  regulations  which  afforded  ‘special 
protection  to  persons  connected  with  the  Defence  Forces  against  increases  in  rents.’
20
The period immediately after WW1 was disruptive as the economy adjusted from war to 
peace-time footing and experienced inflation pressures. While prices were rising in 1919 
they failed to keep up with inflation and, in real terms, prices did not start moving up until
1920 – rents  did  not  turn  up  until  after  1920.  From  these  post-WW1 low  points the 
economy then experienced strong economic growth in the first half of the 1920s but then
weakness in the second half 1925-29 ahead of the Great Depression, when the terms of 
trade moved adversely against Australia. Immigration inflows were slow to pick-up in the 
period  immediately  after  WW1  but  then  registered  stronger  growth  which  pushed 
population growth from sub-2% to 2.5-3% per annum pace from 1922-1928 (Figure 5).
Meredith  and  Dyster  (1999,  page  112-13)  argue  that  this  depended  on  Government 
subsidies to immigrants rather than the drawing power of economic opportunity of earlier 
periods.  Nonetheless, housing  activity,  normally  a  barometer  of  the  general  level  of 
economic activity, was very strong in the first half of the 1920s and really only fell away 
late in the 1920s – the rate of growth of housing stock accelerated to a peak in 1925 and 
then  a  secondary  peak  in  1927  before  falling  away.  In  contrast  with  earlier  periods,
including the 1880s, the growth of housing stock in the 1920s ran well ahead of population 
growth,  suggesting  a  developing  supply-demand  imbalance  which  would  explain  the 
decline  in  activity  after  1927.  This  decline  in  housing  activity coincided  with,  and
contributed to, the first decline in GDP and preceded the stock market crash of 1929 which
triggered the 1930s depression. In terms of prices, from their cyclical low in 1919, prices in 
both Sydney and Melbourne picked up quite sharply in 1921 and then peaked in 1924 at 
35% and 39% respectively above their 1919 levels. Thereafter, they held just below those 
levels for the remainder of the 1920s and while activity fell sharply after 1927, prices did 
not fall until  after the 1929. There is normally  a coincidence between  house price and 
activity cycles but the stickiness of prices in the late 1920s is probably explained by the 
general optimism generated by the strength of equity prices before their collapse in 1929. 
Nonetheless, significant numbers were connected with the Defence Forces and the effect 
would  have  been  to  make new  investment  less  attractive  to  investors.  The  NSW  State 
Government also introduced some protection for renters with its Fair Rents Act 1915 but 
other states refrained from intervention. The net result of these negative effects was that 
prices and rents declined in real terms in the period 1915-18 (Figure 4). On the supply side, 
responding to lower demand and the diversion of resources to the war effort, the rate of 
growth in the housing stock also fell to much lower rates of growth.
19 Official Yearbook of Australia No. 13, page 1091
20 Official Yearbook of Australia No. 13, page 1098. 12
Daly (1982) has described the 1920s as a boom period in Sydney house prices but, while 
clearly well above 1919 levels, prices were still below their peak of 1892 – notionally only 
5% below but factoring in quality improvement more like 10-15% below those peaks.
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Housing fared better in the 1930s depression than was the case in the 1890s in terms of 
prices but the contraction in housing activity was comparable (Table 3). From the 1929 
‘nominal’ peak, Sydney and Melbourne prices fell just 11% and 13% in real terms to their 
respective cyclical lows in 1932 and 1931 (versus the 36% and 51% falls of the 1890s) and 
recovered most of that by 1939. One positive factor for prices was that prices were less 
elevated than was the case in the 1880s and hence there was less room for them to fall. A
second positive was that rents experienced only a small fall, certainly significantly less than 
that  experienced  in  the  1890s.  Another positive  was the  ‘greater  conservatism  of  the 
banking sector (in the 1920s versus 1880s), particularly with regard to credit policy’ (Fisher 
and Kent 1999, page 27) and the related point that bank lending to the private sector was 
also more in line with growth in domestic deposits. This conservative lending would have 
been a constraining influence on prices but also meant that the balance sheets of the banks 
were in much better shape and less vulnerable to foreign financial shocks. While real prices 
fell just 11-13% this was a period of deflation in prices and wages and in nominal terms
median prices fell by more than 25%. From the perspective of banks, this deflation implied 
a rise in the real value of debt and a rise in the debt to asset ratio of their borrowers. The 
fact that, despite this deflation, the banking system’s balance sheets were in better shape 
meant that availability of finance was not tightened as much as occurred in the 1890s which 
would have been a (relative) positive for demand. 
For 
Melbourne, the pick-up in prices in the 1920s, in matching that of Sydney, is probably a 
fair indicator that this market had finally absorbed the supply hang-over from the 1890s. 
In terms of activity, from a rate of growth in housing stock of just over 4% in 1927, that 
had declined  to 3% in 1929 and then fell to just a 0.6% per annum pace in 1933-34. That 
peak to trough deceleration was actually slightly sharper than the experience of the 1890s.
However, the deceleration in population growth from a 3% pace to a 2% pace was not as 
sharp as occurred in the 1890s and, with new supply dipping below population growth in 
the 1930s, the excess supply from the 1920s would have been absorbed by the mid 1930s.
6 Price controls 1942-49
The  price  of  houses  and  rents  in  the  1940s,  and  rents  also  in  the  1950s, was  heavily 
distorted  by price  and  rent  controls,  imposed  during  a  period  of  comparatively  high 
inflation.  In  1939  the  Australian Government  used  its  war-time  powers
22
21 Daly  (1982)  presented  all  his  data  in  nominal  terms,  so  that  there  is  some  inflation  illusion  in  the 
assessment that prices hit new highs in the 1920s.
, to  fix rents 
throughout  Australia  at  their  then  levels  a  measure  which  was  taken  in  most  war-time 
22 Rents  were  fixed  throughout  Australia  and  tenants  provided  protection  against  eviction under  the 
Commonwealth Landlord and Tenant Regulations, enacted as part of the National Security Act, 1939.13
economies, including the US (Block and Olsen 1981) and UK (Coleman 1988). Then in 
1942 the  Australian Government  moved  to  extend  price  controls  to  more  goods  and 
services including, in what appears to have been unique to Australia, the prices of houses 
and  land.  Prices were  fixed  at  levels  that  were  not  more  than  10%  above  a  fair  and 
reasonable  price  as  at  10  February  1942  as  determined  by  an  approved  valuer.
23 As 
valuations  were  used  to  estimate  local  rates  and  taxes,  valuations  were  available  for 
properties. In the early years, before inflation had eroded the real value of the valuations
and notwithstanding the  subjectivity  in  valuation  of  properties, Sidney  Butlin  (19--)
24
describes the task of the valuers as being initially comparatively easy. However, in the later 
years, with real values significantly eroded by inflation, the task became much tougher not 
least because ‘buyers and sellers exerted strong pressure on (the valuers) to produce an 
“acceptable” valuation.’
25 The price controls were circumvented in a number of ways. First,
low prices for houses were offset by excessive payments for furniture. This avenue was 
closed by additional regulation in 1943 which constrained second-hand furniture prices to 
no more than 75% of ‘the ceiling price for new goods’
26. When this loop-hole was closed, 
the  market switched  to  vendors  requiring  key  money – it  was  illegal  but  given  the 
imbalance  in  the  housing  market,  there  ‘was  no  way  of  stopping  this  form  of  black-
market.’
27
When the legislation enabling the price (and rent) controls lapsed on 30 December 1946, 
the controls were included in the Defence (Transitional Provisions) Act. The constitutional 
basis of this new legislation, however, appeared likely to be successfully challenged and, in 
response,  the  Government  sought  by  referendum (of  29  May  1948)  to  amend  the 
Constitution  to  give it  permanent  powers over  prices  and  rents.  When  that  referendum 
proposal was defeated, power to control rents and prices was shortly thereafter transferred 
to  the  States.
28 As  Sidney  Butlin  noted,  the  States  adopted  the  substance  of  the 
Commonwealth laws in their own legislation. However, while the States mostly persisted 
with  rent  controls  albeit  in  steadily  diminished  form  into  the  1960s,  the  price  controls 
proved untenable and the States suspended them in or around September 1949
29
23 So far as I can ascertain, other countries did not control house and land prices. The US and UK did not. The 
Australian  plan  was  given  effect  by  the  National  Security  (Economic  Organisation)  Regulations  of  20 
February 1942, refer specifically Statutory Rules 1941 No. 76 20 February 1942.
.
24 This title is undated. 
25 Sidney Butlin (19--), page 322.
26 Prices Regulation Order No. 1092, Gazette No. 144 as cited in Tebbutt (1950), page 39. 
27 Sidney Butlin (19--) page 322.
28 Formal control was transferred on 16 August 1948 to all States, except Queensland for which transfer 
happened on 1 September 1948.
29 NSW lifted controls on 28 September 1949 (NSW Yearbook 1950). Victoria lifted controls on 5 October 
(Victorian Yearbook 1950).14
As inflation was substantial in the period 1942-49, the pegging of prices implied sizable 
falls in real prices. Consumer prices rose 30% in that seven year period but, more pertinent 
to house prices, the residential construction cost deflator rose 48%
30
With the lifting of controls, house prices rose very sharply. For Sydney, the median house 
price rose 119% from the pegged price which put the 1950 median price 53% above their 
1942 level in real terms and 33% above the increase in costs in the period 1942-50. The 
price estimates by Abelson (1985) and Neutze (1972) also show very substantial nominal 
rises of  77%  and  76%  respectively coinciding  with  the  lifting  of  controls.
. Moreover, inflation 
was  accelerating  and  by  1950  these  two  inflation  measures  were  up  42%  and  64% 
respectively from their 1942 levels. There were significant shortages of building materials 
and scarce labour (Sidney Butlin 19--) which explains the much faster rise in construction 
costs in this period.
31 Indirect 
support for the high magnitude of rises is the price of new houses as there is generally some 
proximity between new and established house prices. For 1950, the median asking price for 
new detached houses was $6400 which represents a nominal rise of 94% compared with an 
estimate of $3300 for new detached houses in 1942. In the case of Melbourne, the price rise 
with the lifting of controls was actually sharper, with real prices in 1950 rising to 79%
above the 1942 level.
32
In nominal terms, capital city house prices continued to rise, not least because of the high 
general inflation associated with the Korean War (1950-53). In real terms, however, 1950
was the peak. Prices remained high in 1951 but then dropped away and by 1953 capital city 
prices had retreated in real terms by about 25%. The retreat can probably be attributed to 
the price levels in 1950-51 containing a degree of ‘overshoot’ in response to the extreme 
situation presented by the price controls. If other demand and cost indicators are looked at, 
they continued to be positive for house prices in the first half of the 1950s. On the demand 
side,  a  post-WW2  rebound  in  immigration  had  lifted  the  growth  rate  in  household 
formation to a 2.5-3% annual growth rate in the years 1947-50 – a good rate but not high by 
historical standards – but this then accelerated to a 3.5-4% growth rate in 1951-54, a pace 
only matched in the first half of the 20th century in the mid-late 1920s. In the hypothetical
absence of price controls, it could be conjectured that this lift in demand would have more 
likely produced a peak in prices in the early 1950s rather than 1950. On the supply side, 
while  house  prices  retreated  after  1950,  the  construction  cost  index  continued  to  edge 
marginally higher in real terms in the period 1950-56, indicating persistent cost pressures. 
30 Source is residential cost deflator from the national accounts estimates by Matthew Butlin (1977).
31 Both are lower than the estimates from my series but are not necessarily inconsistent. The issue with the 
Abelson series is the small sample size. The Neutze series is a calendar year average and as the 1949 estimate 
will have probably included a substantial number of sales in the December quarter after the lifting of price 
controls, the 76% rise will, if anything, understate the actual rise from the pegged price. 
32 Estimates of new house prices are from Stapledon (2007). 15
After  1956,  with  demand  easing and  supply  probably  catching  up  with  demand, 
construction costs then experienced a steady decline in the period 1956-71. 
Interestingly, prices for medium density housing and units, which were predominantly used 
for rental housing, do not appear to rise or recover anywhere near as significantly with the 
lifting of price controls. In real terms, while the price of detached housing was higher by an 
average 43% in 1950-53 (vs. 1936-39), that of medium density houses were about 23%
lower, or 35% relative to the rise in the cost of construction.
33 One explanation for the 
relative decline in the price of medium density houses was that while controls on house and 
land prices were lifted, the NSW State Government (along with other States) legislated to 
continue rent controls. While new houses were exempted from the controls, the existing 
stock remained subject to the controls until tenants moved out voluntarily.
34
Evidence of the impact that rental controls had on the housing market is the substantial 
structural change in ownership in the market in this period. The rental share of houses in 
the capital cities declined from 55% of the market in 1947, to 32% in 1954, and 20% in 
1961.
With the future 
rental stream effectively fixed at 1939 levels, the present value of these properties was 
constrained from rising, except to the extent that investors might anticipate a future lifting 
of  controls.  Then,  as  rent  controls  were  gradually  phased  down,  the  price  of  medium 
density housing could be expected to catch and this is observed in the second half of the 
1950s and again in the 1960s. (In the UK market, Coleman (1988, page 234) observed a 
heavy discount of the market value of residential properties subject to rent controls.) Apart 
from the impact of rent controls, there could be other factors contributing to the recovery of 
the price of medium density housing. For example, with a heavy concentration in the inner 
areas of Sydney and Melbourne, it could be that the location premium in the inner areas 
was rising with the expansion of the urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s, although Abelson 
(1997) argues that, in the case of Sydney, the rise in the location premium was more a 
creature of the 1970s and 1980s than the preceding two decades. 
35
33 Estimates  from  Stapledon  (2007)  data,  splitting  the  samples  between  medium  density  (semi-detached 
houses) and detached houses. Averages for a number of years used to take out the annual volatility. 
In absolute terms, the number of rented houses declined by 25% in the period 1947-
54, while the number of owner-occupied houses almost doubled. This structural shift was 
not unique to Australia, with the US and UK also experiencing a very similar shift in this 
period also in response to rent controls (Block and Olsen 1981; Coleman 1988).  The final 
point to note is that the high rate of owner-occupied housing which emerged in the 1960s 
then became a permanent feature of the housing market in Australia, and also in the US. 
34 Tenants  were  protected  from  eviction  and  various  amendments  in  the  1950s  in  NSW  increased  the 
protection of tenants. In the case of an owner-occupier buying a tenanted property, the new owner had to wait 
a period of six months before taking possession. While this was a disincentive to purchasing such properties, 
sale to owner-occupiers was still a means for landlords to circumvent, or extricate themselves from, the rent 
controls. 
35 The figures for Sydney (and Melbourne) show comparable declines from 55% (53%) in 1947 to 20% (19%) 
in 1961. Source is ABS Census data. 16
7 Post-World War 2 Cycles
Five significant cyclical peaks can be identified in the post-WW2 period in 1950 (discussed
above), 1974, 1981 (in Sydney), 1989, and 2008 (or 2004 for Sydney). The first broad point 
to make is that these price and activity cycles in housing (Tables 2, 3) have been closely 
associated with the post-WW2 recessions and near recessions of the 2000s.
From the 1950s to the 1974 peak was a period of sustained expansion in the economy. The 
one interruption in this period was associated with the 1961 credit squeeze. The credit 
squeeze had a short-term but significantly negative effect on the economy (Meredith and 
Dyster 1999, pages 193-95) so it would be expected to have had some adverse effect on the 
housing market. That is evident in the decline in housing stock growth and also in the ABS 
national accounts for the period which show new dwelling construction activity peaking in 
the September quarter 1960 and then falling by 24% in the next four quarters. Ownership 
transfer costs, which reflect the volume of turnover in the real estate market, fell 22% over 
the same period.  However, the impact on prices appears to have been  muted. Sydney 
market prices show some declines but within an underlying upward trend. Conversely, the 
credit squeeze appeared to be a trigger for the Melbourne market prices to flatten out before 
picking up strongly in the late 1960s. The data on land prices suggests that for both Sydney 
and Melbourne land prices perhaps did not fall during the 1961 credit squeeze. In short, 
evidence of a soft landing for housing prices in an environment in which the expectation 
would be that prices of both houses and land would have fallen.
The next clear peak in house prices for the capital cities (both Sydney and Melbourne) was 
1974 which was preceded by sharp rises in late 1960s and early 1970s. This boom was 
associated  with  the  first  post-WW2 mining boom which  also  ended  when  the property 
boom ended. For Sydney, that peak had prices up 116% on their 1950 peak, while for 
Melbourne the peak had prices up 47% on their 1951 peak. For Sydney, the significant rise 
was associated with a sharp rise in fringe land prices which, as discussed earlier, probably 
account for the whole of the rise.  Fringe land prices rose by a lesser amount in Melbourne. 
From those 1974 peaks, Sydney and Melbourne prices declined by about 18% and 24% 
respectively in real terms. Whereas real price falls in the 1890s and 1930s translated into 
nominal price falls, the high inflation which characterised the 1970s cushioned the fall for 
the property market and in turn also protected the banking system. This episode does not 
rate  as a banking crisis in the catalogue of crises assembled by Caprio and  Klingebeil
(2003) but a number of non-bank lending institutions, some of which were subsidiaries of 
banks, did get into difficulties in the 1970s due to property lending and this led to one small 
bank, The Bank of Adelaide, being directed by the Reserve Bank to be absorbed by a larger 
bank.
36
36 The Bank of Adelaide’s wholly-owned subsidiary Finance Corporation of Australia made substantial losses 
on property lending. The Bank was ‘taken over’ by the ANZ Bank, becoming a subsidiary of that bank on 30 
November, 1979.17
The next major cycle was in the late 1980s. In between, the picture was mixed. Sydney 
appears  to  have  experienced  a  cyclical  peak  in  1981,  but  that  barely  registered  in 
Melbourne. Then there was another minor peak in 1986 before the surge in prices to the 
1989 peak. The 1989 peak saw prices reaching 53% (Sydney) and 27% (Melbourne) above 
their 1974 peaks in real terms. For all capitals the rise was 39% and the peak to trough
decline  1989-91 was  just  8%. In  historical  terms (Table  2),  the  amplitude  of  price 
movements does not make it a significant cycle. In terms of activity, it was also relatively 
insignificant (Table 3). Nonetheless, this cycle was associated with arguably Australia’s 
worst  post-WW2  recession  and  its  second  recognised  banking  crisis (Caprio  and 
Klingebiel). The key to banking losses in this period, which saw Governments rescue two 
State-owned banks and private banks absorb significant losses,  was not the residential 
property market but the commercial property market where, for example, office prices in 
the Sydney market declined by 40%.
37 Similarly, it was the contraction in non-residential 
building  activity  which  was  the  most  significant  factor  in  the  contraction  in  economic 
activity.
38 In this cycle, Melbourne suffered a sharper peak to trough fall in house prices 
than other markets (-19%) and this reflected its worse experience during the recession.
39
The final cycle which commenced from 1996 is an unfinished story at the time of writing. 
While prices hit their trough in 1992, prices did not really move in any material way until 
1996. The trough-to-peak (1991-2004) rise in Sydney prices was 91% to be 73% above 
their 1989 peak. However, on this occasion Sydney has been the laggard – Melbourne 
prices at their peak in 2008 were 115% above their 1989 peak and for all capital cities 
prices at their 2008 peak were 94% above their 1989 level. That puts it ahead of the 1974 
cycle and the 1880s cycle in terms of the magnitude of rises (Table 3) and ranks this period 
as arguably the biggest housing cycle in Australia’s history.
40
37 JLW office property data provided to Westpac where the author worked. 
A crucial difference from
earlier periods in history is that the land component is a larger share of the house price vis-
à-vis the structure, so if we look at booms in terms of land prices, the boom in Melbourne 
in the 1880s would still be bigger. Whereas land prices in the latest cycle have probably 
risen by a factor of just over two, Silberberg (1975) has land prices rising by factor of seven 
or more in the 1880s. What makes this particular cycle interesting is that it is occurring 
against the backdrop of the most significant resources boom in the post-WW2 period and 
probably the biggest since the gold rush period of the 1850s and 1860s which preceded the 
1880s  boom (Battellino  2010).  The  magnitude  of  the  rise  in  prices  in  Australia  is  not 
38 From  peak  to  trough,  private  spending  on  non-residential  buildings  and  structures  declined  37%  and 
subtracted 2.2 percentage points from growth between December quarter 1989 and December quarter 1991, 
with flow-on multiplier effects to other areas of spending. Peak to trough housing subtracted 1.3 percentage 
points from growth.  Source for data is ABS National Accounts Cat No 5206.0.
39 Whereas unemployment nationally rose by 4.9 percentage points from 5.7% in December quarter 1989 to a 
peak of 10.6% in December quarter 1992, unemployment in Victoria rose by 7.7 percentage points from 4.4% 
to a peak of 12.1% in the September quarter 1993.
40 ‘Arguably’ only because we do not have data for the period before 1880. 18
unique – other countries experienced substantial rises with, for example US prices rising
60% in real terms in 10 years to December quarter 2006
41
One final point when comparing the post and pre-WW2 cycles, we can observe that peak to 
trough declines have become less severe, averaging 23% in the pre-WW2 cycles and 13%
afterwards or 10% excluding the early 1950s spike/slump, and the trend is clearly down.
Bearing in mind that the land is a larger component of house prices in the post-WW2 period 
and that the land is the volatile component of a house price, this suggests greater stickiness 
in prices in this period. The caution is that other markets have exhibited significant falls in 
the late 2000s, so the declining trend is no safeguard for the future. Conversely, in terms of 
trough to peak rises the rises have become on average steeper: 30% versus 53%, although 
the  latter  is  heavily  influenced  by  the  1990s/2000s  episode  with  a  rise  of  111%.  That 
steepness in part reflects the impact of the upward trend in prices in the post-WW2 period 
but also, as discussed previously, that the land component is a larger share of the house 
price so that changes in land prices have a larger proportionate impact on house prices.
What stands out more clearly is the degree of volatility in activity. In the three pre-WW2 
cycles, the percentage point decline in housing stock growth averaged 3.6, whereas in the 
cycles associated with five post-WW2 recessions, the average percentage point decline was 
just 0.9 or about quarter. Nonetheless, housing has still played a significant role in the post-
WW2 economic cycles.
– but where Australia stands 
apart in this cycle is the small size of the decline in prices after the peak or in response to 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008. A decline of 4% compares with falls of 19% to 
March quarter 2010 for the aggregate US market but much sharper falls in some segments –
the US housing market was at the epicentre of the GFC. Moreover, that small decline was 
been swamped by a 15% rise in 2010 as concerns about the GFC were outweighed by the 
on-going boost to the economy from the resources boom.
8 Conclusion
The  long-term  history  of  house  prices  presented  in  this  paper  highlights  a  number  of 
interesting periods in Australia’s economic history. such as the period of rent and price 
controls around WW2 which distorted the market and produced consequences not intended
by the policy-makers of the time. Those consequences were a significant decline in the 
stock of rental properties which in turn forced a major shift towards owner-occupation – a
shift which proved long lasting after the rent controls were gradually phased out. 
Importantly, from the perspective of 2010 looking back, the long-term price story puts the 
recent history in some perspective. In particular it has not always been the case that house 
prices  and  rents have  followed  the  sharp  upward  trajectory observed  since  the  1970s.
41 FHFA prices series for US deflated by US national accounts consumption price deflator. Series is all USA 
Purchase Only Indexes (Estimated using Sales Price Data). Produced by Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), the series was previously produced by Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).19
Indeed the trajectory appears to have been a relatively flat one up to the 1950s. The focus 
here has been on the cycles and, while there have been big changes in the structure of the 
economy since 1880, this long history allows comparison of the various housing cycles and 
their links to the broader economic cycles in the economy. In that respect, it is interesting 
that the two most significant  cycles, in different ways, have been the first - 1880s/90s 
boom-bust - and the last, most recent cycle which peaked in the 2000s.
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Table 1: Sydney and Melbourne land prices vs. house prices 1880s-2000s
Sydney median prices Melbourne median prices
Land House  Ratio Land House  Ratio
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3]
$’000, 2007/08 prices [1]/[2] $’000, 2007/08 prices [1]/[2]
1880s 10.6 58.2 18.3% 14.5 51.3 28.0%
1890s 8.7 54.1 16.3% 10.6 44.0 23.5%
1900s 5.5 53.7 10.2% 7.8 45.1 16.8%
1910s 5.8 54.2 10.8% 7.0 43.2 16.7%
1920s 8.2 61.6 13.4% 8.2 54.5 15.2%
1930s 7.7 61.4 12.6% 8.7 51.8 17.0%
1940s 6.5 68.2 9.7% 5.0 57.9 8.4%
1950s H1 10.1 76.2 13.4% 8.2 87.2 9.5%
H2 21.8 84.8 26.1% 18.4 96.5 19.2%
1960s H1 43.7 115.9 37.7% 17.0 97.2 17.5%
H2 61.6 140.6 43.9% 22.3 97.6 22.8%
1970s H1 109.8 184.1 60.3% 25.9 134.0 19.5%
H2 89.2 177.5 49.7% 67.7 138.9 49.4%
1980s H1 96.6 204.1 46.9% 79.7 135.5 59.0%
H2 107.0 239.6 44.9% 105.6 171.4 61.8%
1990s H1 104.2 277.4 37.5% 71.9 165.8 43.4%
H2 146.0 316.2 46.2% 79.4 193.8 40.9%
2000s H1 324.6 467.4 69.8% 129.6 310.2 41.9%
H2 300.0 474.5 63.0% 148.3 396.7 37.3%
Notes to Table:
[1] Period average of median land prices, using data from Stapledon (2007) Table A.14 but with additional 
data collected post-2007. Data can be downloaded from website:
[2] Period average of median house prices for the corresponding period. Periods: 1880 = 1880-1889, etc; HI = 
1950-1954, etc; H2 = 1955-1959, etc 
[3] Ratio of median land price to median house price.23
Table 2: Key Housing Price Cycle Movements 1880-2010
[1]
Sydney Melbourne  All capitals
1880s 1880-Peak Rise 1880-92 +32% 1880-89 +64% 1880-91 +33%
Peak to Trough Fall
1892-94 -36% 1889-95 - 51% 1891-94 -37%
1910s Peak to Peak Change
1892-1913 -11% 1889-1913 -37% 1889-1913 -27%








1920s Peak to Peak Change
1913-24 +6% 1913-24
[2] +35% 1913-24 +15%
Trough to Peak Rise
1916-24 +35% 1916-24
[2] +39% 1919-24 +37%
Peak to Trough Fall
1924-32 -15% 1924-31 -18% 1924-31 -16%
1930s 1930s recovery
1932-39 +15% 1931-39 +4% 1931-39 +5%
1950s Peak to Peak Change
1924-50 +38% 1924-51 +83% 1924-51 +45%
Peak to Trough Fall
1950-53 -28% 1951-53 -32% 1951-53 -28%
1970s Peak to Peak Change
1950-74 +116% 1951-74 +47% 1951-74 +47%
Peak to Trough Fall
1974-77  -18% 1974-80 -24% 1974-79 -16%
Early 80s Peak to Peak Change
1974-81 +16% 1974-81 -20% 1974-81 -8%
Trough to Peak Rise 1977-81 +41% 1980-81 +6% 1979-81 +10%
Peak to Trough Fall 1981-83 -15% 1981-82 -3% 1981-83 -10%
Late 80s Peak to Peak Change 1981-89 +32% 1981-89 +57% 1981-89 +28%
Trough to Peak Rise
[3] 1987-89* +58% 1987-89 +30% 1987-89* +39%
Peak to Trough Fall 1989-91 -9% 1989-92 -19% 1989-91 -8%
1996- Peak to Peak Change 1989-2004 +73% 1989-2008 +115% 1989-2008 +94%
Trough to Peak Rise 1991-2004 +91% 1992-2008 +164% 1991-2008 +111%
Peak to Trough Fall 2004-09 -12% 2008-09 -2% 2008-09 -4%
[1] Changes are the percentage change in real price between the June quarters of the relevant years. 
[2] Melbourne missed the 1910s cycle – for comparison with Sydney.
[3] Sydney and Melbourne had smaller cycles in the mid-1980s with slight dips in 198724
Table 3: Key Housing Supply Cycle Movements 1880-2010
Recession/Event GDP level - peak to trough
[1] Housing  stock  growth  rate  - peak  to 
trough
[2]
GDP Series  Period Percent
decline
Period Percentage  point
decline
Butlin (1962) 1890s depression






1913/14-17/18 -6.8 1913/14-17/18 -3.37
Haig (2001)




1926/27-30/31 -10.3 1926/27-1933/34 -3.47 
Haig (2001)
1928/29-30/31 -18.6
ABS  annual 
series
Korean War
1951/52-52/53 -15.3 1951/52-56/57 -1.84
ABS  quarterly 






















2000 Tech Bubble 
2000  (one  quarter 





2008  (one  quarter




[1] Percent decline in GDP in real terms between the years or (post-1960) quarters.
[2] Percentage point decline in the growth rate of the housing stock between the years.25
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Figure 6: Adult population growth – Melbourne, Sydney  and Other 
Capital Cities, 1881-1916
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